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ABSTRACT
The goal of this study was to examine the growing use of neurological
and behavioral genetic evidence by criminal defendants in US criminal law.
Judicial opinions issued between 2005–12 that discussed the use of
neuroscience or behavioral genetics by criminal defendants were identified,
coded and analysed. Criminal defendants are increasingly introducing such
evidence to challenge defendants’ competency, the effectiveness of defense
counsel at trial, and to mitigate punishment.
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I. INTRODCUTION
Legal scholars, scientists, and commentators lament the onslaught of behavioral genet-
ics and neuroscience in the criminal courtroom. Fueled largely by anecdotal evidence
about the use of bioscience in criminal cases, or media reports of high-profile cases,
there is a growing belief that neuroscience has become a mainstay of the US criminal
justice system. Andwhile scholars increasingly self-identify as part of the growing fields
of ‘law and neuroscience’ or ‘law and the biosciences’, to date only small-scale stud-
ies have been conducted on the use of neuroscience and behavioral genetics in the US
criminal justice system. One recent study involved an empirical analysis of just those
cases in which neuroimaging had been reported in a judicial opinion, with 23 analysed
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486  Neuroscience and Behavioral Genetics in US Criminal Law
cases.1 Other studies have qualitatively, but not quantitatively, assessed the use and im-
pact of neurobiological evidence in criminal law, again relying almost exclusively ondis-
cussion of that evidence in published judicial opinions.2 Any examination of the impact
of behavioral genetics and neuroscience on the US criminal justice system must begin
with a more accurate understanding of how that evidence is currently being used. To
better ground the interest and commentary on the use of neuroscience and behavioral
genetics (hereinafter neurobiological3 evidence) in criminal law, this article summa-
rizes some findings from the widest scale empirical study on the use of neurobiological
evidence in US criminal law to date.
Over the past decade, the outcomes of hundreds of criminal cases have been influ-
enced by neurobiological data. Over 1585 judicial opinions issued between 2005 and
2012discuss the use of neurobiological evidence by criminal defendants to bolster their
criminal defense. In 2012 alone, over 250 judicial opinions—more than double the
number in 2007—cited defendants arguing in some form or another that their ‘brains
made themdo it’. Approximately 5 per cent of all murder trials and 25 per cent of death
penalty trials feature criminal defendantsmaking abid for lower responsibility or lighter
punishment using neurobiological data.While these claims often overstate the science,
used responsibly neurobiological evidence has the potential to improve the accuracy
and decrease errors in the criminal justice system.
Much of the scholarship on neurobiological evidence in criminal law has focused
exclusively on either behavioral genetics4 or neuroscience.5 This study looks at these
sciences together because the claims are inextricably intertwined. First, scientific de-
velopments increasingly link findings from behavioral genetics to neural correlates.
1 Scott N. MacMillan & Michael S. Vaughn,Weighing the Evidence: Neuroimagery Evidence of Brain Trauma or
Disorder in Courts, 46 CRIM. L. BULL. 3 (2010).
2 Eg Diane E. Hoffman & Karen H. Rothenberg, Judging Genes: Implications of the Second Generation of Genetic
Tests in the Courtroom, 66 MD. L. REV. 858, 870 (2007); Erica Beecher-Monas, Circumventing Daubert in the
Gene Pool, 43 TULSA L. REV. 241, 248–50 (2007).
3 I use neurobiological to mean evidence about the study of the brain and the nervous system. This includes
claims about the ‘normal’ brain, abnormal brain, effects on neurotransmitters, brain structure, function, and
genetic contributions to neurological functioning and structure.
4 See eg Deborah W. Denno, Behavioral Genetics Evidence in Criminal Cases, in THE IMPACT OF BEHAVIORAL
SCIENCES ON CRIMINAL LAW 317, 321 (Nita A. Farahany ed., 2009) (behavioral genetics evidence has been
introduced ‘in a wide range of ways, but mostly as some sort of mitigating evidence in a death penalty case’);
Hoffman & Rothenberg, supra note 2; Beecher-Monas, supra note 2.
5 Eg Henry T. Greely, Neuroscience and Criminal Justice: Not Responsibility but Treatment, 56 U. KAN. L. REV.
1103, 1104 (2008); Teneille Brown & Emily Murphy,Through a Scanner Darkly: Functional Neuroimaging as
Evidence of a Criminal Defendant’s Past Mental States, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1119 (2010); Scott N. MacMillan &
Michael S. Vaughn,Weighing the Evidence: Neuroimagery Evidence of Brain Trauma or Disorder in Courts, 46
CRIM. L. BULL. (2010); Amanda C. Pustilnik, Violence on the Brain: a Critique of Neuroscience in Criminal Law,
44WAKE FOREST L. REV. 183 (2009); Laura S. Khoshbin & ShahramKhoshbin, Imaging theMind, Minding the
Image: An Historical Introduction to Brain Imaging and the Law, 33 AM. J. L. &MED. 185 (2007); Peggy Sasso,
Implementing the Death Penalty:TheMoral Implications of Recent Advances in Neuropsychology, 29 CARDOZO. L.
REV. 765, 806 (2007); JohannaC. Jennings, Juvenile Justice, Sullivan, andGraham:How the SupremeCourt’s De-
cisionWill Change the Neuroscience Debate, 2010DUKE L. &TECH. REV. 6 (2010); Stephen K. Erikson, Blaming
the Brain, 11 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. 27, 75–6 (2010); Leona D. Jochnowitz,Missed or Foregone Mitigation:
Analyzing Claimed Error inMissouri Capital Clemency Cases, 46 CRIM. L. BULL. (2010);Michael L. Perlin, ‘And
I See through Your Brain’: access to Experts, Competency to Consent, and the Criminal Trial Process, 2009 STAN.
TECH. L. REV. 4 (2009); J.W. Looney,Neuroscience’s New Techniques for Evaluating Future Dangerousness: Are
We Returning to Lombroso’s Biological Criminality?, 32U. ARK. LITTLEROCKL.REV. 301 (2010); AdamKolber,
The Subjective Experience of Punishment, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 182 (2009).
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As a result, the emerging scientific inquiry into human behavior is trending toward
a neurobiological approach over a purely genetic or neuroscientific one.6 Moreover,
the research in these fields foretells a more integrated future in human behavioral re-
search, whereby genetics and neuroscience are linked rather than compartmentalized.
As one telling example, the March 2010 issue of the seminal journal Behavior Genet-
ics dedicated a special issue to pathways between gene, brain, and behavior. The 15
articles included in the volume represented the diversity of methodologies applied to
the complexity of pathways linking genes, brain, and behavior.The introductory chap-
ter concluded that the breadth of studies proves that tracing the pathways between
biology and behavior requires expertise in genetics, neuroscience, psychology, and
psychiatry.7
The integration is reflected in the use of behavioral genetics and neuroscience
in the criminal justice system. Legal practitioners take a multifaceted approach to
characterizing defendants’ behaviors by introducing genetic, neurological, and envi-
ronmental contributions.MonamineOxidase A (MAOA), the first gene–environment
interaction associated with temperament and antisocial behavior, is a well-studied ex-
ample.8 Although MAOA was first characterized as a genetic polymorphism, which
together with environmental triggers is associated with behavioral variation in anti-
social personality, more recent studies link the genetic and neurological correlates of
MAOA. Joshua Buckholtz et al. published a study utilizing a combined genetic and
imaging approach to the study of MAOA, which implicates a neural circuit for vari-
ation in human personality under genetic control.9 Already, a multifaceted criminal
defense using MAOA genotyping, and neuroimaging has been introduced into crimi-
nal cases.10 Even assuming differences in scientific methodology and results between
behavioral genetics and neuroscience, the substantive legal claims raised are nearly
identical when either science is used in a criminal case. As a result in this study sam-
ple, anytime behavioral genetics was raised; a neuroscientific claim was also advanced.
While neuroscience by far dominates the scientific evidence introduced, the results
here include cases where both neuroscience and behavioral genetics are sometimes
introduced.
With a few notable exceptions, scientists are on the sidelines of these develop-
ments in criminal law. Publicly engaged scientists oftendecry the use of neurobiological
6 Lorraine Caron et al.,Nicotine AddictionThrough A Neurogenomic Prism: Ethics, Public Health, And Smoking, 7
NICOTINE & TOBACCO RES. 181, 197 (2005) (arguing that societal understandings of nicotine addiction will
be shaped by an evolving neurogenomic prism rather than a purely geneticized approach to addiction); Brent
Garland&Mark S. Frankel,Considering Convergence: A PolicyDialogue About Behavioral Genetics, Neuroscience,
and Law, 69 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 101 (2006) (considering the commonalities and differences between
behavioral genetics and neuroscience as they relate to the criminal law, including topics addressed by both
fields, similarities in likely misuse, as well as how each field might be applied in criminal proceedings).
7 William S. Kremen&Kristen C. Jacobson, Introduction to the Special Issue, Pathways Between Genes, Brain, and
Behavior, 40 BEHAV. GENET. 111, 113 (2010).
8 AvshalomCaspi et al.,Role of Genotype in the Cycle of Violence inMaltreated Children, 297 SCIENCE 851 (2002);
William Bernet et al., Bad Nature, Bad Nurture, and Testimony Regarding MAOA and SLC6A4 Genotyping at
Murder Trials, 52 J. FORENSIC SCI. 1362 (2007).
9 Joshua W. Buckholtz et al., Genetic variation in MAOA modulates Ventromedial Prefrontal Circuitry Mediating
Individual Differences in human personality, 13 MOLECULAR PSYCHIAT. 313, 324 (2008).
10 William Bernet et al., Bad Nature, Bad Nurture, and Testimony Regarding MAOA and SLC6A4 Genotyping at
Murder Trials, 52 J. FORENSIC SCI. 1362 (2007).
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488  Neuroscience and Behavioral Genetics in US Criminal Law
evidence criminal law, and call for an outright ban on its use. This is driven in part
by concerns about significant methodological obstacles in the study of human behav-
ior. Most basically are problems about consistently defining the scope and characteris-
tics of particular behaviors. How, for instance, should one define violence? What does
aggression mean? Does criminal behavior include petty crimes as well as violent ones?
Even when scientists do establish a robust and consistent definition for a specific trait
they face difficulties in finding reliable measures of those traits in a manner that sat-
isfies acceptable standards of scientific validity, including reproducibility. Measuring
complex behavioral traits has been difficult, and as a result difficult to replicate in other
studies as well.11 Research into the biological contributions to human behavior face
an additional complication: behaviors, which are complex traits and involve multiple
genes, regulated bywidely varying cellular and neurologicalmechanisms, are subject to
substantial environmental influence.
These scientific concerns underscore the study of complex behavioral traits of inter-
est to the criminal law. No single behavior is appropriately characterized as ‘criminal’.
Any scientific claim about the biological contributions to criminal conduct begins with
a narrower focus on the behaviors often implicated by criminal conduct including vio-
lence, aggression, and drug and alcohol abuse. Studies of those traits and related traits
have likewise yielded only preliminary data that have yet to be well replicated or under-
stood.12
But decrying the use of neurobiological evidence in criminal law seems both futile
and counterproductive; neuroscience is already entrenched in theUS legal system.And
used appropriately, it holds promise of improving decision-making in law. An outright
ban is neither warranted nor productive. But just as neuroscientists go too far in calling
for an outright ban, defense attorneys are guilty of overstating the science. Criminal de-
fendants regularly use neuroscience at every stage of the criminal process, frompretrial,
to trial, and sentencing determinations. Prosecutors, too, have seized upon cognitive
neuroscience to argue that defendants are incorrigible and should be given longer sen-
tences. Neuroscientists can and should play a part in safeguarding these developments.
Rather than standing in the way, neuroscientists should educate the public about the
responsible use of neuroscience in the courtroom.
To empirically ground the dialog about the use of neuroscience in the US criminal
justice system, this article is the first comprehensive empirical study of the use of neuro-
biological evidence inUS criminal justice cases.Drawing fromdata analysed from1585
coded criminal cases, in which judicial opinions were written and published inWestlaw
during 2005–12, this study presents some surprising results and trends in emerging use
of neurobiological evidence in criminal law.
II. BACKGROUND
The cases collected, coded, and analysed in this study demonstrate a rising use of neu-
robiological research in criminal law. That use continues to be haphazard, ad hoc, and
11 Eg KENNETH S. KENDLER& LINDON J. EAVES, PSYCHIATRICGENETICS 197, 198 (American Psychiatric Publish-
ing, 2005) (concluding from aggregate studies in behavioral genetics that the results from behavioral genetics
research are often inconsistent across studies).
12 Eg Richard P. Bentall, Psychiatry’s Failed Paradigm, WASHINGTON POST, Jan. 4, 2010 (finding that without
exception later studies have failed to replicate findings of genetic links to schizophrenia, or 5-HTTLPR).
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often ill conceived. While scientists caution that the neurobiological evidence at issue
is weak, particularly for making claims about individuals rather than studying between-
group differences, their cautionary advice has largely gone unheeded. Even the gravest
decisions, including assessments bearing on deservingness for capital punishment, are
beginning to turn on this research.13 Defense attorneys have introduced behavioral ge-
netics and neuroscience in attempts to exculpate criminal defendants, to bolster pre-
existing legal defenses, and to mitigate defendants’ culpability and punishment. Prose-
cutors have seized upon the double-edged potential of a claimed neurobiological evi-
dence to denigrate defendants’ characters and to demonstrate defendants’ likely future
dangerousness.
As the science continues to develop, its potential use in criminal investigations,
interrogations, and predictions of dangerousness will undoubtedly rise. The discov-
ery of more specific biological and neurological contributions to violence, aggres-
siveness, impulsivity, substance abuse, even though highly contestable and inde-
terminate as a scientific matter, has foreshadowed an inevitable reexamination of
the US criminal justice system. Indeed, the United States Supreme Court has al-
ready become involved in evaluating the relevance of neurobiological evidence to
criminal culpability: in September of 2006, it granted certiorari to address, in part,
whether a defendant’s genetic predisposition to violence should inform whether he
should be sentenced to death for first-degree murder.14 Liberty, justice, privacy,
and the structure and purpose of the US criminal justice system are all at issue.
A careful and systematic study of the use, perception, current and likely impact of
neurobiological evidence on criminal law is essential before its application further
expands.
III. METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH
Seventeen law students and three undergraduate students were trained over time on a
coding book developed by the author that included 84 variables.The students included
second and third-year law students, with varying scientific background. All undergrad-
uate students were majoring in scientific disciplines. The 84 variables are detailed in
the coding book with specificity to ensure uniform coding. These variables included,
for example, purely identifying information about the case, the purpose for which the
behavioral genetics or neuroscience evidence was introduced, the outcome of the case
(successful or unsuccessful for the criminal defendant), the state where the case was
heard, and the types of attorneys or representation present. Coders were first given the
coding book, and asked to code a set of four test cases. After coding the four cases, they
were trained in detail on the meaning of each variable through an intensive in-person
training session with Farahany.They were then given a second set of test cases to code,
and discrepancies were reviewed and discussed with Farahany. Coders were then were
given cases in sets of 10 to code, which were spot-checked by Farahany. Subsequent
13 Eg Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (citing Amicus discussion of adolescent brain development to
support finding juveniles less culpable and categorically exempt from capital punishment); Graham v. Florida,
560U.S. 48 (2010) (finding life imprisonment for juveniles violates the 8thAmendment, citing to neurological
evidence about adolescent brains for support).
14 Landrigan v. Schriro, 550 U.S. (2007) (resolving the case on alternate grounds. Opining, in dicta, that genetic
predisposition evidence is at best equivocal with respect to criminal culpability).
 at D
uke U
niversity Law
 School on A
pril 5, 2016
http://jlb.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
490  Neuroscience and Behavioral Genetics in US Criminal Law
cases were coded separately by two different coders to ensure accuracy.There was less
than 5 per cent disagreement between coders, and typically pertaining only to the na-
ture of the claim raised. Farahany reviewed all coding with spot-checking, and resolved
any conflicts that arose between the coders.
Cases in the study were selected from searches of the Westlaw legal database us-
ing the keywords and variations on the words: neuroscience, frontal lobe, hereditary,
head injury, pet scan, EEG, fMRI, CT Scan, Brain Disorder, Cognitive Impairment,
MEG, NIRS, Brain Scan, Brain, Diffusion Tensor, Heritable, Hereditary, Genetic, Bi-
ological, Memory, Frontemporal, and qEEG.TheWestlaw databases used included all
US Supreme Court, all federal court and all state court.
The broad search terms used search yielded over 10,000 opinions per year, which
were then scanned for relevance. After excluding cases that did not bear on the
use of neurobiological evidence by a criminal defendant, 1585 cases were included
in the study, and all opinions in those cases—majority, plurality, concurring, and
dissenting opinions—for a total of 1800 judicial opinions, were coded. Cases in
which the scientific evidence focused on the victim or forensic identification were
excluded.
Limitations ofMethodology
The legal opinions coded for this study were selected from theWestlaw legal database.
Westlaw’s inclusion criteria for judicial opinions are proprietary, unpublished, andmay
have changed during the study time period. These variations may account for some of
the year-to-year differences in the number of opinions discovered.Moreover, the cases
contained therein are primarily appellate opinions, since trial opinions at the state level
are often jury verdicts without written judicial opinions. Consequently, the opinions
coded may reflect defendants’ failed attempts at using neuroscientific evidence at trial,
failure to by defense counsel to investigate or introduce neurobiological evidence at
trial, or newly discovered evidence on appeal. The sample may be skewed toward de-
fendants who have already fared poorly in the criminal justice systemwith their claims.
Moreover, more than 90 per cent of criminal cases in the United States never
go to trial. Most individuals who are charged with a crime forego their constitutional
right to a trial and plead guilty in exchange for a plea agreement.15 Of those cases that
do go to trial, while many are appealed, many more are not. Of cases that are appealed,
there are narrow legal grounds available for overturning a conviction or setting aside a
sentence and procedurally the cases must be raised in that manner. Moreover, investi-
gation into neurobiological contributions to criminal behavior can be costly. In cases
where the defendant has adequate resources, or able to secure resources from the state,
or as pro bono services, they are more likely to be able to introduce neurobiological
evidence. This may skew the kind of criminal defendants who raise claims rooted in
neurobiology.These skews maymean the sample of cases here underreports the actual
use of neuroscience in the criminal courtroom. And that the cases are skewed toward
unsuccessful use of neurobiological evidence.Hence, while the present empirical study
significantly advances the ethical, legal and social discussions with respect to the use of
neurobiological evidence inUS criminal law, it is still a narrow view of the overall issue.
15 TIMOTHY LYNCH, THE CASE AGAINST PLEA BARGAINING, REGULATION (2003).
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IV. RESULTS
A.Overview
Most studies on the use of neurobiological evidence in criminal cases claim it’s used
almost exclusively to mitigate capital punishment and with limited success.16 The find-
ings discussed herein suggest both a broader—and potentially more successful—use
of neurobiological evidence in US criminal law.
The data show an increasing trend in using neurobiological evidence in criminal
cases. Significant differences by state also appear, including the extent to which the evi-
dence has been introduced, and the ultimate success of that evidence.These differences
can be explained in part by population differences, and varying legal regimes across
states (eg the availability of capital punishment, the type of insanity defense available in
the state, or the relevance of a diminished capacity defense).The implications of these
statewide differences are important and require more research.
Importantly, neurobiological evidence is being used for purposes not yet discussed
or analysed by scholars. For example, while many scholars have discussed the impli-
cations of using neurobiological evidence for mitigation of criminal punishment, vir-
tually no author has discussed the implications of using it to assess the competency
of a criminal defendant. And yet the empirical analysis herein illustrates that the sec-
ond most common use of biological neurobiological evidence in criminal cases is to
challenge competency.The implications of this use, and the relevance of behavioral ge-
netics and neuroscience to competency determinations, are critical areas for further
exploration.
Finally, while attempts to introduce neurobiological testimony have been relatively
unsuccessful to date, the attempts may have been more successful than most scholars
believe. Depending on the type of claim that a criminal defendant raises, testimony by
an expert on the matter may serve as powerful evidence that impacts the outcome of
the case for the defendant.
In short, the fundamental assumptions guiding the current ethical, legal and social
inquiry into the use of neurobiological evidence in criminal law are limited and poten-
tially flawed.Thegoal of this study is to broaden the dialog andbring empirical evidence
to bear on the discussion.
B.General Findings
1. Use of Neurobiological Evidence is Increasing in Criminal Cases
Thenumber of judicial opinions discussing theuseof neurobiological evidenceby crim-
inal defendants is increasing year over year (see Graph 1). Contrary to popular belief,
many of these cases are ‘not’ capital homicide cases (the prosecutor did not seek the
16 See O. Carter Snead, Neuroimaging and the ‘Complexity’ of Capital Punishment, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1265,
1292–3 (2007) (asserting ‘defendants have enjoyed the greatest success with neuroimaging evidence
at the sentencing phase of capital trials in connection with mitigation claims’); Sasso, supra note 8
(concluding neuropsychological evidence is generally used during the sentencing phase); Greely, supra
note 5 (predicting biological predisposition evidence will increasingly be used not to diminish responsibility,
but to influence sentencing); Erikson, supra note 5 (neuroscience will primarily impact sentencing because
defendants will be treated as lacking culpability); MacMillan & Vaughn, supra note 8; Pustilnik, supra note 8;
Khoshbin&Khoshbin, supra note 8; E. Spencer Compton,NotGuilty by Reason of Neuroimaging:TheNeed for
Cautionary Jury Instructions, 12 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 333 (2010).
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492  Neuroscience and Behavioral Genetics in US Criminal Law
Graph 1. Judicial opinions discussing neurobiological introduced by criminal defendants
2005–12. (Homicide (capital) are murder cases in which the prosecutor sought the death
penalty. Homicide (not capital) are some degree of homicide (murder, manslaughter) cases
in which the death penalty was not at issue. Other felony cases are those in which the
defendant was not charged with homicide.) C© Author, 2016.This image/content is not
covered by the terms of the Creative Commons licence of this publication. For permission to
reuse, please contact the rights holder.
death penalty, or itwas unavailable as a sentence in that jurisdiction).Defense attorneys
are introducing neurobiological evidence across the board in serious felony cases, and
not just in bifurcated capital sentencing hearings following a conviction of first-degree
murder.
What started as about 100 judicial opinions per year discussing neurobiological evi-
dence in criminal law in 2005 climbed to around250–300opinions in 2012.Thequality
and not just the quantity of opinions discussing neurobiological evidence has evolved.
Opinions earlier in the study often discuss neurobiological evidence as part of a laundry
list of other types of scientific evidence introduced. In later opinions, judges spilled sub-
stantial ink discussing the neurobiological evidence often in significant detail and with
citations to scientific literature and the experts who testified in the case (see Graph 2).
This suggests a shift in both the frequency and the nature of how such evidence is being
evaluated by judges and juries in criminal cases.
2. Nature of the OffenseWhenNeuroscience Introduced
One surprising result is how broadly neurobiological evidence is being by criminal de-
fendants at trial.The popularmantra in academic circles is that the use of neurobiologi-
cal evidence is primarily a phenomenon limited to capital cases, as mitigating evidence
for sentencing. In the sample of opinions studied here, only about 40 per cent of the
cases were capital, and a staggering 60 per cent of cases were other serious felony cases.
Drilling down further by looking at the most serious crime a defendant was charged
with in the sample, it becomes clear that across felony cases neurobiological evidence
is being used as part of criminal defenses (see Graph 3).
In the 60 per cent of non-capital cases where neurobiological evidence is intro-
duced, neurobiological evidence is also introduced in drug possession and trafficking
cases, violent assaults, robbery, fraud, andmore. Although this sample likely underrep-
resents the prevalence of neurobiological evidence used in criminal cases due to the
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Graph 2. Degree to which neurobiological evidence is discussed in Judicial opinion.
(Mention is in a list of information. Some is less than one paragraph of the opinion.
Substantive is one paragraph or more of the opinion discussing the neurobiological
evidence introduced by a criminal defendant.) C© Author, 2016.This image/content is not
covered by the terms of the Creative Commons licence of this publication. For permission
to reuse, please contact the rights holder.
Graph 3. Most serious offense charged with when neurobiological evidence raised in
non-capital cases, 2005–12. An evaluation of the most serious criminal charge (per case)
that the defendant was charged with to illustrate the range of felony cases impacted by
neurobiological evidence. C© Author, 2016.This image/content is not covered by the terms
of the Creative Commons licence of this publication. For permission to reuse, please
contact the rights holder.
methodological barriers discussed supra, a conservative estimate based on this sample
alone is that neurobiological evidence is introduced in at least five to 6 per cent of mur-
der trials in the USA, and 1–4 per cent of other felony offenses.17
17 Based on analysis of Bureau of Justice Statistics and FBI arrestee data from 2005–12.
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494  Neuroscience and Behavioral Genetics in US Criminal Law
Graph 4. Neurological testing discussed in criminal opinions 2005–12. (The number of
opinions per year in which each time of neurobiological testing is discussed. Interview+ =
neuropsychological testing/evaluation, as well as medical or other history of head/brain
trauma; Scan+ = some form of brain scanning evidence, neuropsychological
testing/evaluation, as well as medical or other history of head/brain trauma; History only=
medical or other history of head/brain trauma but no other form of testing discussed in
opinion; No neurotesting= no discussion of any form of neurological testing introduced in
opinion.) C© Author, 2016.This image/content is not covered by the terms of the Creative
Commons licence of this publication. For permission to reuse, please contact the rights
holder.
3. Type of Neurobiological Evidence
One explanation for differences in the findings of this study versus other empirical stud-
ies on theuseof neurobiological evidence is a difference inwhat ‘counts’ in these studies
as neurobiological evidence. In this study, the neurobiological evidence includes med-
ical history (such the use of past medical records or medical history of head injuries
or brain damage), neuropsychological testing (through interviews, battery of testing,
and/or evaluation of the defendant), brain scanning of the defendant, or assertions that
the defendant suffers from brain or head injury.
Notably, only about 15 per cent of the cases where neurobiological evidence was
raised in the sample had any form of brain scanning discussed in the opinion (see
Graph 4). A large proportion of the cases (nearly 40 per cent) have no discussion of
neurological testing in the opinion, even though the defendant staked their defense in
part on a claim that ‘his brainmade him do it’.18 Of course, it’s entirely possible that the
judicial opinion did not discuss the specifics of testing that actually was introduced in
the criminal case, so this is a conservative estimate of testing introduced.
In the15per cent of cases that included adiscussionof brain scanning in theopinion,
the type of scanningwasmost oftenMRI orCAT scans, rather thanmore sophisticated
functional neuroimaging such as EEG, SPECT, or fMRI scanning (seeGraph 5). Func-
tional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) was discussed in about 2 per cent of the 15
per cent of scanning cases, but in each of the cases the fMRI evidence was not admitted
18 A next step in this analysis would be to obtain all of the original records from trial, rather than relying on a
discussion of the evidence introduced in the judicial opinion, as the casesmay have included forms of evidence
that supported the neurobiological claims not discussed in the opinion.
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Graph 5. Distribution of neuroimaging discussed in Judicial opinion 2005–12. (In the
opinions where neuroimaging was introduced, the type of neuroimaging. SPECT=
single-photon emission computed tomography; qEEG= quantitative
electroencephalography; fMRI= functional magnetic resonance imaging; Unknown= brain
scanning discussed but type not mentioned; BEAM= sometimes known as qEEG, brain
electrical activity mapping; CAT= computed tomography; EEG= electroencephalography;
MRI=magnetic resonance imaging; PET= positron emission tomography.) C© Author, 2016.
This image/content is not covered by the terms of the Creative Commons licence of this
publication. For permission to reuse, please contact the rights holder.
into the case for further consideration because of concerns about scientific reliability,
credibility, or relevance.
C.Context for the Introduction ofNeurobiological Evidence
1. Pretrial
One surprising finding is the extent to which neurobiological evidence is used in pre-
trial proceedings (seeGraph 6). In pretrial proceedings, the subjectivemental state and
competency of the defendant can be contested. At this phase of trial, neurobiological
evidence may offer a way to improve subjective competency evaluations. Judges typi-
cally engage in a colloquy with a defendant and rely upon their own perception of the
defendant, together with mental health evaluations, to rule on the defendants’ compe-
tency. Neuropsychological testing, neurological history, and neuroimagingmaymean-
ingfully and appropriately improve such judgments and perceptions.
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Graph 6. Distribution of neurobiological evidence-based claims in capital and non-capital
cases, 2005–2012. (The denominator is all claims raised in the study sample.The numerator
is the specific type of claim. E.g. for mental retardation, 1% of the claims raised in the study
sample were for a claim of mental retardation in a non-capital case.) C© Author, 2016.This
image/content is not covered by the terms of the Creative Commons licence of this
publication. For permission to reuse, please contact the rights holder.
a. Competency. The United States Constitution forbids the trial of a defendant who
lacks mental competency. The test for competency to stand trial is whether a criminal
defendant has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable de-
gree of rational understanding.19
At any point during a trial, the competency of a defendant can be challenged, but it
often arises as a pretrial issue, to address whether the defendant has the present ability
to proceed.20
Finding a criminal defendant incompetent to stand trial does not necessarily mean
that he is set free. Rather, he may be indefinitely detained in a psychiatric facility until
he is rendered competent, or if he never is, remain there until he no longer serves as a
present danger to himself or to others.21
The data here show a frequent use of neurobiological evidence to challenge defen-
dants’ competency during criminal proceedings. In 15 per cent of the neurobiological
evidence-based claims raised in the study sample, the defendant argued that something
unique about his brain rendered him incompetent to proceed during the criminal case.
Of the 15 per cent of all of the claims in the study pertaining to competency, 77 per
cent of those challenged the competency of the defendant to stand trial. A smaller but
19 Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960).
20 Stephen L. Golding &Ron Roesch,Competency for Adjudication: An International Analysis, in 4 LAW ANDMEN-
TAL HEALTH: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 73, 109 (David N. Weisstub ed., Pergamon 1988).
21 JOHNMONAHAN&HENRY J. STEADMAN (eds.),MENTALLYDISORDEREDDEFENDANTS: PERSPECTIVES FROMLAW
AND SOCIAL SCIENCE, 48, 49 (Spring Science+Business Media, LLC, 1983).
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Graph 7. Nature of competency claims raised when neurobiological evidence introduced by
criminal defendants. C© Author, 2016.This image/content is not covered by the terms of the
Creative Commons licence of this publication. For permission to reuse, please contact the
rights holder.
increasing proportion of claims focused upon the defendant’s lack of competency to
waive his rights, to plead guilty, or to have confessed to the crime or crimes at issue (see
Graph 7).
Consider for example the case of Miguel Angel Ruiz, who was found incompe-
tent to stand trial based on neuropsychological testimony about his brain disorders.
In February 2007, 17-year-old Miguel Angel Ruiz (Ruiz) was charged with murdering
his mother. In January of 2008, a trial court suspended criminal proceedings against
Ruiz to assess his competency to stand trial. After a hearing and a subsequent jury
verdict finding Ruiz competent to stand trial, the trial judge set aside the verdict and
concluded that there was no reasonable, credible evidence to support a finding that
Ruiz was competent. He issued a judgment to that effect notwithstanding the jury’s
verdict. 22
Ruiz presented testimony from two neuropsychologists who had performed a bat-
tery of tests on him. The prosecution introduced evidence from correctional officers
who had interacted with Ruiz while he was awaiting trial.23
Oneof thedefense experts diagnosedRuizwith a severe languagedisorder that arose
from an organic brain-processing deficit that interfered with his language skills. As a
result, he had severe inability to converse, explain, or impart information, all critical
elements of being able to assist in his own defense.24 Another expert concluded simi-
larly, that Ruiz had a developmental language disorder, specifically that ‘the left part of
his brain, which deals with language skills, did not develop aswell as the right part of the
brain, which deals with nonverbal skills’. The expert believed this was a congenital dis-
order ‘because a brain injury after birthwould have affected hismotor skills, whichwere
intact’. After administering standard tests to determine if Ruiz was faking his disorder,
the expert testified that there was no evidence of malingering.25
22 People v. Ruiz, 2010WL 298561 (Cal. 5th. Dist. Ct. App. 2010).
23 Id. at ∗1.
24 Id. at ∗1,∗ 2.
25 Id. at ∗3,∗ 4.
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The trial judge set aside the determination of the jury, stating ‘I’m not inclined to
set aside a jury’s decision lightly or unadvisedly . . . but quite frankly when I received
the verdict after hearing the evidence, I was surprised. I just couldn’t believe the jury
could return a finding of competency based on the evidence I heard. . . The testimony
of both experts in the court’s mind is very persuasive. . . And as a result, I’m setting aside
the jury verdict in this matter’.26 The California Court of Appeals for the Fifth District
affirmed the trial court’s decision to set aside the jury’s verdict on finding the defendant
competent to stand trial.
While highly unusual to set aside a jury’s finding of fact, neurobiological evidence
appears to have powerful factual and persuasive appeal to judges. The result is that
in a substantial portion of cases where competency is raised, credible evidence of
neurobiological impairment may enable more legitimately impaired defendants to ob-
tain a favorable finding of incompetent to proceed.
(i) Competency to plead guilty
Similarly and relatedly, the right to Due process under the United States Constitu-
tion requires that a defendant’s guilty pleabeknowing, voluntary, and intelligent.27 Tra-
ditionally, the bar to withdrawing a guilty plea has been quite difficult to surmount. In-
deed, guilty pleas are rarely set aside.28 Defendants are using neurobiological evidence
to argue that based on their neurological functioning at the time of entering their guilty
plea, they did not enter that plea in a knowing, voluntary and intelligent manner.
In 2007, for example, Richard Hodges pleaded guilty to possession of cocaine and
residential burglary.29 As the judge engaged inwhat is knownas aplea colloquy,Hodges
occasionally appeared lost, asked questions about matters not relevant to the plea pro-
cess, and exhibited confusion.30 The court ordered a competency determination in-
cluding a neuropsychological examination and MRI testing.31 The experts concluded
that Hodges was faking it. They found no neurological reasons for Richard’s problems
and determined his learning abilities were within normal limits. After hearing all of the
expert testimony, the judge concluded that Hodges was not suffering from an organic
brain disorder.32
In some cases, the court has set aside a guilty plea and remanded the case for an ev-
identiary hearing on claims of competency to enter a guilty plea.33 In other cases, the
court has rejected the neurobiological evidence as contrary to his perceptions of com-
petency based on the plea colloquy. To be sure, attempts to withdraw guilty pleas still
largely fail. But it’s interesting to note the extent to which claims about the involuntari-
ness or lack of competency to have entered a guilty plea are grounded in neurobiology.
26 Id. at ∗6.
27 Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 261–2 (1971).
28 Wesley M. Oliver,The Present and Future Regulation of Plea Bargaining: A Look at Missouri v. Frye and Lafler v.
Cooper, CATO SUPREME COURT REVIEW, 257, 280 (2011–2012).
29 State v. Hodges, 156Wash. App. 1015 (Wash. Ct. App. 2010).
30 Id. at ∗3.
31 Id. at ∗1.
32 Id.
33 See eg Arseneau v. State, 77 So. 3d 1280 (Fla. 2012).
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This is an area to watch over time to see if framing these issues as ‘brain disorders’ will
have an effect on case outcomes.
(ii) Competency to confess
In amuch smaller portion of the defendants use neurobiological evidence to exclude
evidence of past confessions. A particular difficulty for defendants raising these claims
is the inability to go backward in time using present neuropsychiatric testing to un-
derstand the defendant’s competency when questionedmonths or years prior to being
evaluated.
Daniel Thomas,34 for example, was stopped for a traffic violation when the police
officer noticed the smell of marijuana and a large blanket draped over what seemed
to be a big square object in the back seat. A search of the car found 110 kilograms of
marijuana.Thomaswas arrested, andwaivedhisMiranda right to remain silent.He gave
incriminating statements to the police, including a written statement. Later, he sought
to suppress the evidence of hiswritten confession, arguing thatwhenhewaivedhis right
to remain silent he did not do so voluntarily, knowingly, or intelligently because he was
suffering from severe migraine headaches and brain injury.
A neuropsychologist testified at Thomas’s suppression hearing that a brain injury
could cause a degree of cognitive impairment that under stress would manifest more
symptoms. These symptoms could include problems with attention, concentration,
and memory. In combination with stress and sleep-depravation,Thomas’s brain injury
might impair his attention and concentration, and that poor attention in turn could im-
pair his ability to process information. Thomas would be more likely to lose focus and
be more vulnerable to distraction. He would have a reduced ability to knowingly and
intelligently waive his rights.
The judge acknowledged that the expert accurately described a person with trau-
matic brain injury but believed other evidence established that Thomas had adequate
memory and intelligence to voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waive of his Mi-
randa rights. The judge pointed to the time lapse before he wrote out his confession,
and the counterexpert who said that given the defendant’s educational and professional
background such a deficit could not be considered a significant impairment. Based on
theobjective observations of thedefendant’s capacities, the courtwas unconvinced that
defendant’s brain injury impeded his ability to knowingly and intelligently waive his
rights.
This appears to be a rather typical outcome in these cases. Because the present neu-
robiological evidence may have little bearing on the defendant’s actual competency to
have confessed at the time of the crime, courts may give neurobiology little weight par-
ticularly in comparison to other circumstantial evidence that bears on the defendant’s
likely capacities at the time.
b. Insanity. Although it captures popular imagination, the insanity defense is raised
infrequently and notoriously difficult to prove.35 Although the precise requirement of
the insanity defense varies by jurisdiction, an approach common to many states is the
34 U.S. v. Padilla andThomas, 2010WL 1719367 (D. Arizona 2010).
35 Randy Borum & Solomon M. Fulero, Empirical Research on the Insanity Defense and Attempted Reforms: Evi-
dence Toward Informed Policy, 23 L. &HUM. BEHAV. 375, 378 (1999).
 at D
uke U
niversity Law
 School on A
pril 5, 2016
http://jlb.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
500  Neuroscience and Behavioral Genetics in US Criminal Law
requirement that the defendant have a complete lack of understanding of the difference
between right and wrong. This legal standard can be exceedingly difficult to establish,
since mental illness typically results in some degree rather than complete impairment
of understanding. Jurors also tend to overcredit claims that a defendant is faking (ma-
lingering) their impairment. Although the first issue, the legal standard of insanity, is
nearly impossible to overcome, to whether the defendant is malingering is an area that
neurobiological evidence may inform.36
It is for this second purpose—bolstering claims of mental illness—that defendants
usedneurobiological evidence in about four per cent of the claims analysed in the study.
Consider the case of Mr Chavez, who seemed to have a psychotic break while car-
rying a metal pole.37 Perched at a busy intersection on the sidewalk and armed with a
metal pipe, hemenacingly approached cars as they stopped at a red light harassing them
by asking ‘Is this your car? Is this your car?’while hitting the windows of the car.38 The
victims later testified that Chavez looked ‘kind of crazy’ and ‘evil looking’. When the
police arrived, Chavez told the officer to ‘shoot him as he was going to smash him’.39
He was ultimately arrested. At trial, his defense counsel argued that Chavez was legally
insane during the incident and introduced expert testimony that he was suffering from
schizopaffective disorder of a bipolar type and a manic break at the time of the offense.
A neuropsychologist testified that Chavez had a dysfunction in the frontal lobe region
of his brain with an IQ of 79. A PET scan of defendant’s brain revealed certain abnor-
malities in the left lateral frontal area.
The state’s expert countered thatChavez’smental illness hadno impact onhis ability
to understand the nature and quality of his acts, and to know that his acts were wrong
when he committed them, focusing on the legal concept of insanity.With regard to the
incident involving the deputy, the state’s expert opined that the defendant intentionally
attacked the deputy because he didn’t like what he was being told, defendant’s aware-
ness of what he was doing and that it was wrong.
The jury foundChavez sane and convicted him for assault on the police officer.This
example underscores that while neurobiological evidencemay bolster a finding ofmen-
tal illness or impairment, the legal standard for insanitymay still remain an insurmount-
able hurdle for most defendants.
And yet, neurobiological evidence can and has assisted some criminal defendants
with their claims of legal insanity. A particularly telling case is highlighted in the 2011
opinion in the case ofThomas Curtis vs. the State of Indiana. In December 2009, Cur-
tis was charged with murdering his wife.40 In 2010, Curtis filed a notice of intent to
introduce the insanity defense and the trial court appointed a psychologist and a psy-
chiatrist to evaluate him. Both experts testified that they believed Curtis was insane at
the time he killed his wife.The trial court nevertheless found Curtis guilty but mentally
ill (‘GBMI’).41 Both the psychologist and psychiatrist who evaluatedCurtis thought he
36 SeeNitaA. Farahany& JamesE.Coleman, Jr.,Genetics andResponsibility: ToKnow theCriminal from theCrime,
69 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 115, 126 (2007).
37 People v. Chavez, 73 Cal. Rptr. 3d 189 (Ct. App. 2d CA 2008).
38 Id. at 189, 192.
39 Id. at 189, 193.
40 Curtis v. State, 925 N.E.2d 887, ∗1 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011).
41 States have attempted to reduce verdicts of not guilty by reason of insanity by allowing the alternative verdict
of guilty but mentally ill (GBMI). This is meant to serve as an intermediary sentence between guilty and not
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was unable to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct. Both believed he suffered
from PTSD from his time in the military, and ‘organic brain injury’.42 Upon review of
the trial judge’s decision to enter a GBMI verdict the appellate court found that there
was neither expert nor lay opinion that Curtis was sane at the time he killed his wife. In-
stead, the trial court had been swayed by the inadequacy of available treatment noting
that in a state hospital Curtis would be ‘kicked out as soon they can’, and ‘then there’s
no guarantees’. The trial court rejected ‘the insanity defense after concluding that the
defendant could continue to be a danger to society because of an inadequate Statemen-
tal health system’.43 Although sympathetic to the trial court’s concern, the appellate
court credited the uncontroverted evidence of legal insanity, reversed the judgment of
GBMI, and remanded the case for an entry of not guilty by reason of insanity and the
appropriate commitment proceedings.44
The trial court’s concern is echoed throughout the study opinions. While neurobi-
ological evidence may be compelling evidence to bolster a finding of incompetency or
insanity, without adequate mental health treatment options available courts and juries
are left to struggle with how to appropriately weigh the evidence while also safeguard-
ing the communitywrit large froman admitted andpotentially untreated or untreatable
dangerous neurobiological predisposition.
2. Judging Guilt
Neurobiological evidence has been considerably less helpful in determining whether
a defendant has committed a crime. Neurobiological evidence is often used to chal-
lenge the folk psychological beliefs underlying criminal law: that actions are voluntary
and the product of conscious choice. The alternative—that actions arise from uncon-
scious predispositions over which an individual has little control—has made little in-
roads in criminal law. Most basically, the concepts of voluntariness and intentionality
in law don’t map well onto how those concepts are understood by scientists. Nor does
a theory that individuals are automatons and unable to control their actions align well
with our subjective experiences of self-directed decision-making. Finally, the science—
usually population-level science (such as a correlation between neurological or genetic
variations and behavioral variations across a population)—doesn’t tell us much about
why any particular individual behaved as they did. As a result, attempts to use neurobi-
ological evidence for determinations of guilt or innocence seems to make far less of an
impact than attempts in pretrial and sentencing determinations.
a. Involuntariness. In about 4 per cent of the study-sample claims (∼7 per cent of the
judicial opinions) defendants argued that their neurobiology made them act involun-
tary. Typically, this involved a claim of involuntary conduct following the voluntary
ingestion of drugs or alcohol.These claims appear to be non-starters.
Prosecutors start out ahead as a matter of law in proving that a defendant acted vol-
untarily. Criminal law grants a strong presumption that defendants act voluntarily.This
guilty by reason of insanity, although in practice it may not result in a different sentence than a guilty verdict.
See eg John D. Melville & David Naimark, Punishing the Insane:The Verdict of Guilty but Mentally Ill, 30 J. AM.
ACAD. PSYCHIAT. LAW 553, 555 (2002).
42 Curtis v. State, 925 N.E. 2d 887, ∗2 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011).
43 Id. at ∗5.
44 Id. at ∗4.
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presumptionmeans that the defense that a person acted involuntarily will only succeed
in a narrow set of circumstances. The defense of ‘involuntariness’ is recognized if a de-
fendant’s actions were a reflex or convulsion, a bodily movement arising from uncon-
sciousness, sleep, hypnosis, or by some factor other than actor’s will.45 These automa-
tism cases are legal freaks, but a growing chorus of scientists argues that they should
serve as a paradigm; decision-making is primarily ‘unconscious’, they say. Perhaps, un-
beknownst to the chorus, those claims have been featured in criminal courtrooms.
Judges are certainly not allowing all of these claims into the courtroom as one opin-
ion about a high-speed car chasemakes plain.46 In this case, a police officer saw a known
former criminal offender with an outstanding warrant for his arrest at a gas station, and
approached him when the defendant returned to his car. 47 The officer asked the de-
fendant to step out of the car but the defendant instead instructed the driver to take
off. 48 What ensuedwas a high-speed car chase culminating in the driver stopping in the
middle of the street and backing his car into the police officer’s car to injure him. The
defendant was arrested and convicted with resisting arrest and assaulting the officer.
On appeal he argued that the trial court judge made a legal error in excluding relevant
expert testimony regarding his head injuries and subsequent blackouts.
Eight weeks prior to this incident a tree limb fell on his head. At the time he had a
CAT scan andMRI performed on his head and neck. Because of his head injury, the de-
fendant claimed that he was acting unconsciously in a blacked out state of shock during
the police chase.
The trial judge excluded the neurobiological evidence because it wasmisleading and
irrelevant. A mere failure to remember an event does not excuse its occurrence unless
the failure to remember signifies involuntary or unconscious conduct. No expert sup-
ported the neurobiological claim. Instead, the experts agreed that while the defendant
had been hit on the head the MRI and other evidence did not support neurological
trauma, blackouts, or states of unconsciousness.
This case is an exemplar of the claims raised. Nearly 40 per cent of the opinions
addressing automatism claims do not discuss any neurological testing of the criminal
defendant. Instead, the claims appear to be rooted in past head injuries or other trauma
the defendant alleges to have suffered.49
b.Mental States. It’s all themore important that neuroscientists start talking about the
responsible use of neurobiological evidence in law, because it has already influenced
jury decision-making about defendants’ mental states. In approximately 10 per cent of
all the claims raised in the study, the defendant argued that neurobiological evidence
showed he lacked the mental state necessary to commit the crime.
45 Model Penal Code § 2.01. Requirement of Voluntary Act; Omission as Basis of Liability; Possession as an Act.
46 State v. Allsup, 2011WL 332734, (Ohio App. 3 Dist. 2011).
47 Id.
48 Id.
49 In the 109 judicial opinions discussing claims of involuntariness, 40 of the cases appear to have included no
neurological testing and 36 of the 109 (33 per cent) did not mention any expert testimony whatsoever. See eg
In theMatter of Brownv. Fischer, 948N.Y.S.2d 779 (N.Y.App. 2012) (where defendant assaulted nursing staff
taking his blood pressure, he claimed his conduct was involuntary arising from his brain cancer and seizures.
While recognizing defendant does suffer seizures, no medical proof linked his seizures to involuntary conduct
at the time he assaulted the nurse).
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The typical defendant uses neurobiological information to argue that he acted im-
pulsively rather than with the premeditation or purpose contemplated by the crime
definition. So claimed John Gunther who was charged with first-degree murder of his
mother in 2008.50 Gunther used a metal pipe to bludgeon his mother to death and
she died of blunt force trauma to her head. He did so apparently to steal her money,
television, VCR, and jewelry to purchase drugs. He admitted to killing his mother
and threatening to do so many time but ‘denied planning or intending to kill her’.51
In support of his claim, two experts testified on his behalf. The first, a clinical psy-
chologist and neuropsychologist, reviewed Gunther’s medical records and evidence of
head trauma in 2007 and again in 2008. This medical history together with a series of
neuropsychological tests the expert administered supported his conclusion that Gun-
ther had damage to his frontal lobe ‘possibly reducing his ability to premeditate or de-
liberate, and instead causing him to act impulsively on the night he killed hismother’.52
A second expert concurred echoing that Gunther’s brain injuries could explain killing
hismother as impulsive and ‘affect[ing] his ability to formmental states such as specific
intent to kill his mother, premeditation or deliberation’.53 The jury nevertheless found
Gunther guilty of first-degree murder, which requires deliberation and premeditation.
In reviewing the jury’s determination on appeal the court found the jury reached a rea-
sonable conclusion: ‘Here, the jury reasonably could conclude that Gunther planned
to murder his mother. He repeatedly told several people, over an extended period of
time, that he hated her. . . . He asked [another] to help him kill her. . . . Gunther’s con-
versations were sufficiently frequent and detailed as to signal his intent to murder his
mother, which he eventually did’.54
This opinion is consistent with howother courts approach neurobiological evidence
whenused to challengemental state. Presentedwith circumstantial evidence consistent
with planning and premeditation andwith conflicting neurobiological evidence, judges
and juries tend to credit the circumstantial evidence over the neurobiological.Thismay
be in part because of the near impossibility of understanding the defendant’s mental
state at the time the crime was committed. Neurobiological evaluations cannot take us
backward in time to understand what the defendant was thinking, feeling, or why the
defendant acted as he did. It may possibly tell us something about the defendant’s gen-
eral behavioral predispositions. But the missing link between predisposition evidence
and the causes and intentions of any specific actions cannot presently be overcome.55
Moreover, concepts like mental states are narrower in criminal law than the lay per-
spective may assume. Mental state in criminal law is about the intentionality with re-
spect to the specific act in question.Did the defendantmean to swing the pipe (purpose
of the act), understanding the person he was swinging the pipe at was another human
being (the circumstances), and that the impact of swinging a pipe at another person
would be to cause grave bodily suffering or injury (consequences)? With this narrow
understanding of themental state necessary to convict a criminal defendant, it becomes
50 People v. Gunther, 2012WL 924846 (Ct. App. 4th. Div.Cl. 2012).
51 Id. at ∗3.
52 Id.
53 Id. at ∗4.
54 Id.
55 See generally David L. Faigman, John Monahan & Christopher Slobogin, Group to Individual (G2i) Inference
in Scientific Expert Testimony, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 417 (2014).
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apparent that at least as the law is presently understood neurobiological evidence may
provide little support. In only the rare case will neurobiological evidence address the
purpose of the act, an understanding of the circumstances or anticipation of the conse-
quences.56
More direct dialog between neuroscientists and attorneys could better inform both
groups about how concepts like voluntariness and mental state differ in both law
and science, which could lead to more responsible testimony by neuroscientists in
criminal cases about the (ir) relevance of neurobiological evidence to determining the
voluntariness or mental state of the defendant. Greater engagement by leading neu-
roscientists in the legal process would substantially improve both judges’ and jurors’
understanding of the limitations of science in answering the questions that law poses in
addressing voluntariness and mental state.
c. Sentencing. Fundamentally, neurobiological evidence is fueling a societal debate
about why we punish people who commit crimes. Do we do so because defendants
deserve punishment for their acts of wrongdoing? Do we punish to protect society
against dangerous criminals? And if so, would this goal be better served by rehabilitat-
ing and reintegrating into society thosewho commit crimes? Although neurobiological
evidence cannot answer these philosophical questions for us, it can provide empirical
evidence about human behavior that bear on these discussions.
And yet, neurobiological data may tell us little about any particular defendant and
whether they are deserving of punishment. It’s this concern—that studies do not tell us
why a particular person behaved as they did—that seems tomotivatemany scientists to
oppose theuse of neurobiological evidence in sentencing. But regardless ofwhether sci-
entists agree or not about the appropriate role of neurobiological evidence in criminal
law, neurobiological evidence seems clearly entrenched in sentencing decisions.Devel-
opmental neuroscience has served as the empirical basis for recent constitutional pro-
hibitions against the execution of or life imprisonment of juveniles.57 And theremay be
a coming tsunami of neurobiological evidence-backed sentencing claims at trial. Trial
attorneys have already been found ineffective at trial because they failed to investigate a
defendant’s probable neurological abnormality (even though defendants rarely prevail
otherwise on such claims).
Approximately 44per cent of theneurobiological claims raisedwere attempts tomit-
igate sentencing.58 Nearly half of those claims were the defendant arguing he received
ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to introduce neurobiological evidence at sen-
tencing.59 More than half of the sentencing claims were for capital cases, while the re-
maining 42 per cent were non-capital cases.
To establish a defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel hemust show that
his attorney acted ‘below an objective standard of reasonableness’, and there was a rea-
sonable probability that but for counsel’s unprofessional errors the outcome of the case
likely would have been different.60 Defendants can rarely establish both prongs of this
56 See Nita A. Farahany et al., Supra note 36, at 115, 123–5.
57 Eg Roper v. Simmons, 543U.S. 551 (2005); Graham v. Florida, 130 S.Ct. 2011 (2010);Miller v. Alabama, 132
S.Ct. 2455 (2012).
58 820 of the 1861 claims were claims of mitigation.
59 369 of the 820 claims for mitigation were raised as ineffective assistance of counsel claims.
60 Strickland v. Washington, 366 U.S. 668 (1984).
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claim. In fact, even when defense counsel has slept through substantial portions of a
trial, judges have ruled that defendants did not receive ineffective assistance of coun-
sel.61 It’s particularly notable then that judges have already found that failing to inves-
tigate a reasonable probability of a brain abnormality constitutes ineffective assistance
of counsel.
Even in cases with horrific facts, judges have found neurobiological evidence an es-
sential component of counsel investigation. Inone case,62 a defendant andhis coworker
went to a bar in Arizona where they consumed almost two-dozen beers.When they left
the bar, they picked up a female victim walking along the side of the road. Eventually,
things turnedbadly between these three andoneof the defendants turned a knife on the
woman. He sexually assaulted her, slit her throat, stabbed her over 30 times and then
left her mutilated body in the desert. He was convicted by a jury of first-degree murder
and sentenced to death. He presented volumes of new evidence on appeal about his
brain damage and neuropsychological deficits. The court found a reasonable probabil-
ity that the sentencing judge would have imposed a sentence less than death had the
defendant’s counsel obtained and presented an expert evaluation of his neuropsycho-
logical functioning. The court believed this was ‘powerful’ evidence of mitigation and
therefore found that the defendant’s trial counsel had rendered ineffective assistance of
counsel by failing to investigate it.63
Such rulings put neurobiological evidence in a rarified position of must-investigate
evidence. Defense counsel are ineffective if they fail to mount a defense at all, sleep
through an entire (but not just parts of) a trial, or if they fail to investigate a probable
neurological abnormality in a defendant. One of these things is not like the others, and
its odditymakes clear that neurobiological evidence is an embeddedpart of the criminal
process.
To further underscore this point, consider that it may be entirely reasonable to
choose not to introduce neurological evidence because of it’s double-edged potential.
When the defendant Connie was convicted64 of burglary, battery, kidnapping, sexual
battery with great force, and first-degree murder of 77-year-old woman in her own
home, his neurobiological evidence-based defense didn’t just fail, it did so miserably.
In the closing statement of the trial, the prosecutor summed up the neurobiological
evidence he introduced saying:
So, what are we left with? . . . a doctor [] comes in and tells you . . . he couldn’t help it, he
was born that way. This man was born evil, born bad, he’s going to be that way for now
on and there’s nothing I can do except identify it for you. . . . he’s got diffuse brain damage
and he goes around raping women and beating them up... Well, Ladies and Gentlemen,
you decide howmuch mitigation that deserves. Howmuch weight do you give to he just
does it because he does it? 65
61 EgMuniz v. Smith, 647 F.3d 619 (6th Cir. 2011).
62 Dietrich v. Ryan, 619 F.3d 1038 (9th Cir. 2010).
63 Id.
64 Israel v. State, 985 So. 2d 510 (Florida 2008).
65 Id.
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The jury voted 11-1 in favor of the death penalty, and the judge followed their rec-
ommendation. It’s entirely unsurprising that evenupondiscoveringneurobiological ev-
idence defense attorneys may often choose to forego using it as part of mitigation.
This is particularly true where civil commitment may later be at issue. Once a crimi-
nal defendant has been released from prison he can be involuntarily civilly committed
if he continues to serve as a danger to himself or the community.This is most prevalent
in cases of ‘sexually violent predators’, which requires proving that a person has a past
conviction of a sexual offense, is likely to reoffend, and has a diagnosedmental disorder
that makes the person a danger to the health and safety of others. Some of the brain
abnormality evidence introduced by a criminal defendant at trial can cut against him at
a civil commitment hearing.
For example, when a defendant committed a series of sexually violent attacks and
was convicted and sentenced to 15 years in state prison, he was sent to a state hospi-
tal as a mentally disordered sex offender instead.66 While there, he failed the treatment
programs because of his repeated sexual advances to female staff members.67 In a later
civil commitment proceeding, the court weighed heavily that the defendant had suf-
fered a serious head injury when struck in the head by the butt of a shotgun.68 A year
and a half after the injury, his behavior became more aggressive, and the experts con-
cluded that the brain injury was likely a factor in his crimes.69 Based on this evidence,
the court concluded that the defendant’s capacity to control his violent sexual tenden-
cies would be seriously impaired if released into the community and committed him to
confined institutionalization.70
d. Sentencing for Juveniles. Mitigation by adolescent offenders using neurobiology has
been met with more consistent receptiveness. Ninety-one of the cases in the study
pertained to juveniles (about 6 per cent). Eighty-four of those cases used a ‘develop-
ing brain’ theory rather than the more individualized neurobiological claims raised by
adult offenders.Thedevelopingbrain theory is about the juvenile brain generally, rather
than specifically about the particular offender.These defendants argue that the juvenile
brain is still developing—that the frontal lobe region is still underdeveloped and that
the brain is not fully myelinated—and that as a result juveniles should be treated less
harshly than adults. The fact that the brain is still developing means a juvenile has less
capacity for self-restraint, but also means that their criminal conduct is not representa-
tive of how they will behave as an adult with a fully developed brain.
In a triology of cases, the United States Supreme Court has cited to evidence about
the developing juvenile brain to find it unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment
of the United States Constitution to executive juveniles,71 to impose life without the
possibility of parole for non-homicidal offenders,72 or to have a mandatory scheme of
life imprisonment without the possibility of parole.73 Since the latest of these cases,
Miller v. Alabama, there is considerable confusion and debate by lower courts about
66 People v. Calderon, 2009WL 428911 (Cal. App. 2009).
67 Id.
68 Id.
69 Id.
70 Id.
71 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
72 Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010).
73 Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. (2012).
 at D
uke U
niversity Law
 School on A
pril 5, 2016
http://jlb.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
Neuroscience and Behavioral Genetics in US Criminal Law  507
Graph 8. Case outcome in adult trials when neurobiological evidence is introduced by
defendant.+means the defendant achieved a positive outcome on appeal, whether as a
reversal, remand, or modification of a component of the trial courts’ decision. – means the
defendant did not achieve any positive outcome on appeal.
the meaning of that ruling and the extent to which a judge must consider neuroscience
when sentencing a juvenile offender.
3. Case OutcomesWhenNeurobiological Evidence Introduced
So how does this neurobiological data fare in criminal cases? Generally, between 20
and 30 per cent of defendants enjoy some success on appeal, in part because of neuro-
biological evidence, in capital case and non-capital case alike. Although a one-to-one
comparison of matched cases where neurobiological evidence was not introduced can-
not be done to accurately understand how neuroscience impacts case outcomes, the
success rate on appeal in these cases appears to be higher than in criminal appeals in
general. Comparing the reversal rates in these cases versus all criminal appellate cases,
the reversal rate in cases with neurobiological evidence is higher. In a 2010 study of the
estimate 69,348 criminal appeals in the US, in only about 12 per cent of the cases did
the appellate court reverse, remand, or modify a component of the trial courts’ deci-
sion.74 Whereas the success rate in death penalty study cases was 23 per cent (merits
and non-merits cases together), compared to the 18.6 per cent success rate in death-
penalty merits appeals overall. The success rate in non-capital cases also appears to be
higher in the study cases—the general reversal rate in non-capital caseswas 7.7 per cent
(merits cases) and 2.3 per cent (without a review of the merits), while the overall re-
versal rate was 20 per cent in the non-capital cases in the study.75 The reversal rates by
specific claim raised are illustrated in Graph 8.
We have not been able to locate any comparable data against which the relative suc-
cess rate in juvenile cases with and without neurobiological cases can be compared.
The data from the Bureau of Justice Statistics excludes cases pertaining to juveniles.
The study cases show that, in general, the juvenile defendants fared better than adult
74 Nicole L. Waters et al., Criminal Appeals in State Courts, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Sep. 2015, NCJ 248874,
http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/casc.pdf (accessed Nov. 1, 2015).
75 Id. see Table 1.
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Graph 9. Case outcome in juvenile trials when neurobiological evidence is introduced by
defendant. Favorable means the defendant achieved a positive outcome on appeal, whether as
a reversal, remand, or modification of a component of the trial courts’ decision. Unfavorable
means the defendant did not achieve any positive outcome on appeal.
defendants, in some categories achieving as high as a 38 per cent favorable outcome on
appeal (see Graph 9).
CONCLUSION
The use of neurobiological evidence in criminal cases may draw serious criticism and
justifiable concern by scientists. But neurobiological evidence also has improved the
criminal justice system through better competency determinations and reconsidera-
tions about the role of punishment in society. And neurobiological evidence at times
replaceswhatwas even shoddier evidence thatwe relied about tomake inferences about
the individual capacities and behavior of a criminal defendant. Given the recent rulings
about the neurobiological evidence and ineffective assistance of counsel, it’s safe to as-
sume that neurobiological evidence is now a mainstay of our criminal justice system.
As a result, it’s time for a more nuanced dialog between neuroscientists, legal
decision-makers, and the public about the role of neurobiological evidence in the crimi-
nal courtroom. It’s no longerproductive to call for outright bans; neuroscientists should
help to improve public understanding about what neurobiological evidence can and
cannot tell us about human behavior.
At the same time, the dialog about how neurobiological evidence is being used in
criminal cases by legal scholars, commentators, and the media should account for the
differences between popular perception and the results of this study.The use of neuro-
biological evidence is clearly more widespread and nuanced than previously believed.
Some successful efforts are already underway to improve public understanding of
law and cognitive neuroscience. To name a few, the Dana Foundation and the Ameri-
canAssociation for theAdvancement of Science have launched aNeuroscience in Soci-
ety Series that has hosted a number of pertinent events to inform judges and the public
about advances in cognitive neuroscience. The John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur
Foundation funded a multiyear project on Law and Neuroscience, which includes an
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educational component. The Royal Society in London has issued a four-part series of
accessible reports on the developments in neuroscience and their implications for soci-
ety, public policy, and law.The Presidential Commission for the Study of Bioethical Is-
sues has issued a two-part report entitled “GreyMatters,” that includes a detailed chap-
ter and recommendations on law and neuroscience. Dozens of worldwide academic
conferences have been held on the topic. And a recent PBS special entitled ‘Brains on
Trial’ engaged neuroscientists, philosophers, and lawyers to educate the public about
thesedeveloping trends.Butmore can and shouldbedone to engage thepublic on these
issues—after all it is the public who constitutes the criminal jury.
Neuroscientists should be at the forefront of this conversation—as experts in crim-
inal courtrooms, in public presentations, through accessible writing for public audi-
ences, or by filing amicus briefs in legal cases where neurobiological evidence is at issue.
Neurobiological evidence has profound implications for some of the most significant
decisions wemake in law and policy. It’s time we better understand how it’s being used
and start to address how it may be better used in our criminal justice system.
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